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Abstract
The widely held picture of dynamical symmetry as surplus structure in a physical
theory has many metaphysical applications. Here I focus on its relevance to the question
of which quantities in a theory represent fundamental natural properties.
1 Introduction
The proper role of physics as evidence for metaphysicians is the subject of much dispute (see
e.g. Maudlin (2007) and Ladyman and Ross (2007)). But there is one topic in metaphysics on
which almost all will agree that physics is most qualified to comment. We commonly think of
our universe as made up (at least partly) of some fundamental natural properties, quantities
which each take on one of a range of physically possible values. Typical examples include
mass, position, energy and electric charge, though it may be that these will be replaced as
fundamental quantities by something like the amplitude of the quantum wavefunction or the
configuration of superstrings. Although this conception of the world as made up of natural
quantities has been challenged, most famously by Goodman, it remains an important part
of most accepted systems of metaphysics.
It is therefore a very good question, according to these systems, what the fundamental
natural quantities actually are, and perhaps also what they might be in other physically
possible worlds. And it is normally thought that fundamental physics provides our best
means of answering this question.
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This means it is of paramount importance, metaphysically, to develop a method for ex-
tracting from a physical theory a description of the fundamental quantities according to that
theory. One promising method, which has received significant attention in the philosophy of
physics literature, appeals to the concept of symmetry. My threefold goal here is to introduce
this method, provide a prima facie argument in its favor, and discuss some cases in which
it seems to work rather well.1
The first step will be to make clear what symmetry signifies in physics. The word is used
in a few different ways, but I’ll be concerned here with dynamical symmetries. This concept
admits an intuitive as well as a formal definition; the intuitive definition is: symmetries of a
theory are transformations that preserve its laws.
We have a rough sense of what it means for a transformation to preserve an object – that
is, map it to itself. A square with four identical corners and four identical sides is preserved in
this way by 90-degree rotations, but not by 45-degree rotations, which map it to a diamond
instead of an identical square. We say that the 90-degree rotations leave the square invariant
by mapping it to a qualitatively identical geometric object. In a similar way, transformations
like real-world rotations can leave the laws of physics invariant. Newton’s theory accurately
predicts how long it will take my pencil to fall if I let go of it, and these predictions are
preserved even if the pencil and myself are both rotated by some angle in space. Since all
the predictions of Newtonian mechanics are preserved in this way by rotations, the group of
all rotations is a symmetry of Newtonian physics.2
The formal definition requires a bit of mathematical machinery. Complete physical the-
ories like Newtonian mechanics, relativity and quantum mechanics can be formulated in a
mathematical arena called a state space. We use that name because every element in state
space stands for a physically possible (instantaneous) state of the world according to our
theory. The experimental information we get from a theory comes in the form of predictions
about how states will change over time. We call this account of temporal change a theory’s
1The method I present here is one of many proposals, and it is perhaps less nuanced than most. I see its
simplicity as a virtue, but many others would call it oversimplified. For an opposing view of symmetries, see
Maudlin (2002, 1-7).
2By “group” I mean something more interesting than a family or set. A group G is a set with a distin-
guished “identity” element e and a “product” (two-place function) (·) such that e · g = g for all g ∈ G and
every g ∈ G has an “inverse” g−1 such that g−1 · g = e. The set of all rotations in three-dimensional space
clearly form a group (called SO(3)) if we define the product of two rotations as the result of performing one
rotation and then the other.
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dynamics ; mathematically, the dynamics is sometimes represented by time-indexed transfor-
mations U(t′) on state space that takes a state at time t = 0 to the state it will change into
at time t′. So a theory’s dynamics is a mapping from states to states. Transformations like
rotations are also given by mappings T from states to states. Symmetries are then given by
transformations that leave the dynamics (diachronic laws) unchanged. Mathematically, this
means they must commute with the dynamics, so that U(t′)T = TU(t′) for every symmetry
transformation T and every time t′. It will turn out that transformations like these meet
our intuitive condition of leaving the laws invariant.3
With the concept of symmetry in hand, we now move on to the question of why these
transformations should have any systematic metaphysical importance. In short, it will turn
out that states related by symmetries must share identical values of all fundamental quan-
tities.
2 Using symmetry to find fundamental quantities
What features distinguish fundamental quantities from non-fundamental ones? Most impor-
tantly, fundamental quantities are supposed to ground or explain objective similarity between
objects and states of affairs, in a way that non-fundamental properties cannot. For example,
two electrons are objectively similar because they are both negatively charged (and thus
agree on a fundamental quantity), but not because they are both mentioned in this article.
The relation of similarity grounded by fundamental quantities on this picture is supposed
to be objective – it’s up to Nature, not us, to determine which things are qualitatively similar.
One plausible necessary condition for objectivity is invariance under descriptive changes.
The relation of similarity between objects shouldn’t change depending on which language,
coordinate system, etc. I use to describe them.
A coordinate system (at least in familiar Euclidean geometry) is a piece of surplus struc-
ture. It’s something extra we add to the theory to aid us in describing coordinate-independent
facts. It has been suggested, for example by Belot (2001), that physical quantities which
vary under symmetry transformations are like coordinate systems in this way. In other
3Time-indexed dynamical transformations of this sort are not always well-defined. In general, this article
will follow most of the literature in ignoring and oversimplifying a very deep problem: given a physical theory,
how do we determine its symmetries? See Belot (in progress) for a sophisticated look at these problems.
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words, the symmetries of a physical theory are a guide to surplus structure in the theory’s
formalism. If this is correct, and if changes in surplus structure are generally (as in geome-
try) mere descriptive changes, it follows that physical situations related by symmetries must
be qualitatively identical. And if this is right, then physical quantities that change under
symmetry transformations (i.e., that are not invariant) must not be fundamental quantities.
Qualitatively identical objects or worlds cannot disagree about the fundamental quantities.
Why believe that symmetry transformations change only surplus structure? This question
is somewhat murky, and my answer will signify a good place for those who disagree with
my approach to get off the boat. It’s an answer I find compelling nonetheless. It rests on
the notion that the language of fundamental physics is complete in a particular sense: in a
satisfactory physical theory, the fundamental quantities are all dynamical difference-makers.
Difference-makers, that is, in the sense that differences in the fundamental quantities must
make some difference in how the state of a (physically possible) world evolves in time.
It would be bizarre if by fixing the values of all fundamental quantities, we could not
thereby fix (if not deterministically, at least probabilistically) how a physical world will
evolve in time. In my view, the converse seems equally plausible: if objects (or worlds) are
fundamentally different, fundamental physics should recognize and explain that fact. A the-
ory in which some fundamental quantities are completely epiphenomenal is, for that reason,
an unsatisfactory theory. A quantity is epiphenomenal, I take it, if it can be left out of a
complete dynamical explanation of the world’s evolution in time. It follows that quantities
with no bearing on the evolution of the world’s physical state must not be fundamental. Dy-
namical explanations can make do without these quantities, so their claim to fundamentality
is suspect.
The present approach may also be bolstered by an epistemological argument of the sort
offered by Healey (2006). Without addressing the metaphysical question of whether possibil-
ities related by symmetries could differ qualitatively, Healey argues that it is never justifiable
to accept a theory according to which they do differ. He bases this on a preference for the-
ories which are “uniquely realized,” which means that all of their theoretical terms can be
defined using the method proposed by Lewis (1970). Theories which are not uniquely real-
ized (“multiply realized” theories) require that we use demonstrations if we want to name
theoretical entities or properties with indistinguishable roles in the theory. For example, if
water and twater are distinct substances with indistinguishable roles in our theory, we will
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have to name them by pointing at particular pools of liquid, rather than defining one (per
Lewis’s method) as the unique realizer of the water role and the other as the unique realizer
of the twater role.
Lewis (1970, 146) claims that “A uniquely realized theory is, other things being equal,
certainly more satisfactory than a multiply realized theory,” and Healey adamantly agrees.
When it is possible to formulate a theory with terms whose reference is uniquely fixed by
their role in that theory, Healey thinks we should do so. To do otherwise would be to flout
Ockham’s dictum to seek out simpler theories; more importantly for Healey, it would be to
turn against the scientific realist tenet that the explanatory power of a theory is what gives us
reason to believe in its truth. A multiply realized theory is unsatisfactory because it includes
“elements purporting to represent real structures but that play no role in contributing to the
theory’s success,” since nothing about the theory’s success hinges on how these elements of
the theory are defined. To describe the world using a multiply realized theory requires that
we define its theoretical terms arbitrarily, in such a way that at least one other definition
would do just as well.
By treating possibilities related by symmetries as fundamentally identical, this arbitrari-
ness can be avoided. In this case, every fundamental quantity will possess a unique theoretical
role – otherwise it would be related by a symmetry to any other quantities with identical
roles. So the present approach can ensure that any theory of the qualitative facts is uniquely
realized – and thus epistemically preferable to the alternatives, by Healey’s lights.
Other arguments to this same conclusion, that qualitative features are invariant under
symmetries, have also been advanced. Roberts (2008) provides a convincing argument (really
an explanation of a well-known fact) that measurable quantities must be invariant. So if
one holds to a modest verificationism according to which qualitative features of the world
must be measurable in principle, the conclusion about symmetries follows. A similar point is
made by Ismael and van Fraassen (2003), who explicitly endorse such verificationism. I don’t
necessarily agree with this premise myself, but those who do should embrace my approach
to symmetries.
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3 Spacetime symmetries: Leibniz equivalence
The most straightforward – and fruitful – consequences of my preferred approach to sym-
metries can be found in the interpretation of spacetime theories. A symmetry-based under-
standing of these theories allows us to separate the question of whether space (or spacetime)
exists from related questions about the modal features of its parts (points and regions). One
of Leibniz’s most important theses about Newtonian mechanics is really a claim about the
modal properties of points, and it can be defended decisively if we treat the symmetries
of mechanics as surplus structure. This thesis of Leibniz equivalence can be formulated
analogously in relativistic theories of spacetime, and remains plausible there for the same
reasons.
A major point of contention between Leibniz and Clarke was the possibility of certain
counterfactual arrangements of matter in space. Clarke held that all of the spatial relations
between material objects might have been just as they actually are, but the positions of
these objects shifted uniformly with respect to space itself. We all might have been located
a foot to the left of where we actually are, and everything else been the same. Leibniz denied
this possibility.
Leibniz defends his view by appeal to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). In an
important paper, Belot (2001) shows that the same work can be done by a somewhat re-
visionary version of PSR that treats qualitatively indiscernible worlds as identical. Belot’s
PSR can always be defended against purported counterexamples, he claims, if we insist (as
in the present approach) that symmetries reveal surplus structure.
In applying his PSR to Newtonian mechanics, Belot presents an important mathematical
structure that can be constructed for any physical system with symmetries: the reduced
state space. Recall that we defined a symmetry as a mapping on state space (the space of
“physically possible worlds” of a theory). The reduced state space is the space of equivalence
classes of worlds related by symmetries. In other words, it is exactly the structure we get if
we identify worlds related by symmetry transformations – qualitatively identical worlds, on
the present approach.
How does this work in Newtonian mechanics? As Belot explains, the state space Newton
used for his mechanics of N particles is 6N -dimensional: there are six degrees of freedom for
each particle, including its position and momentum in each of three dimensions in physical
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space. (Note that in this case each degree of freedom corresponds to a fundamental quantity.)
This state space includes many qualitatively identical states related to each other by global
translations or rotations of all the matter in space, or by global increases in the velocity of all
matter (which we call Galileian boosts). The set of all these transformations taken together
is the Galileian group, the symmetry group of Newtonian mechanics.
In constructing the reduced space of the Newtonian state space by identifying states
related by Galileian symmetry transformations, we effectively reduce the theory’s degrees of
freedom. For example, there are distinct states in Newton’s state space that differ only by
the position (in absolute space) of the universe’s center of mass. All these states are treated
as a single state in the reduced space. As a result, three degrees of freedom – the ones needed
to specify the position of the center of mass – are left out of the reduced space. In total, ten
degrees of freedom can be eliminated in this way, corresponding to the position and linear
motion of the center of mass and the rotational motion of the universe as a whole.
Thus while Newton believed his N -particle mechanics required 6N fundamental quan-
tities, 6N − 10 will do perfectly well. This revision will in turn require a picture of space
and time according to which quantities like the position and linear motion of the universe’s
center of mass are not needed to give a full description of a physical possibility. That sort of
picture is provided by so-called Galileian spacetime, in which acceleration, but not position
or velocity, is absolute.4 In this way, the present approach to symmetry points toward a
superior picture of space and time compatible with the success of Newton’s theory. The
key was to identify states that are related by spacetime symmetries as the same physical
possibility. The inference from spacetime symmetry to physical equivalence has sometimes
been called “Leibniz equivalence,” after his early arguments to similar conclusions.
The present approach can be applied similarly, and even more successfully, to our most
advanced spacetime theory: general relativity (GR). Unlike previous spacetime theories, GR
doesn’t occur against the fixed background of a single spacetime. Instead, many distinct
spacetimes (with distinct symmetries) are solutions of the same theory. The symmetries of
these individual spacetime solutions often provide interesting (although physically contin-
gent) information. But the interesting symmetries for purposes of the present approach are
4As Belot points out, we can even do without absolute acceleration if we count global variables for the
total angular momentum of the universe as fundamental quantities – although this further parsimony is not
entailed by the present approach to symmetry.
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the symmetries of GR as a whole: diffeomorphisms.
A diffeomorphism is simply a differentiable map taking all points in a spacetime to all
points in another (or the same) spacetime. In effect, a diffeomorphism is a re-labeling
or re-assignment of spacetime points which leaves unchanged spacetime’s matter content
and its metric structure (distance relations). For example, a diffeomorphism must leave
unchanged the distance between massive objects, but may alter which spacetime points those
objects occupy – in doing so it also alters the distance relations between the points. On the
present approach to symmetries, a physical spacetime should be given by a diffeomorphism
equivalence class of mathematical spacetimes. The diffeomorphism symmetry of GR thus
tells us that it makes no physical difference which points occupy which physical roles, so
long as the same physical roles and relations are instantiated.
What would it be like for the assignment of physical roles to points to be of metaphysical
significance? This would require, at a minimum, the existence of primitive facts about the
trans-world identity of points. For, if diffeomorphisms can relate different possibilities, it
must be possible for spacetime points to have their qualitative features reversed (or at least
for two different points to have the same qualitative features in two different worlds). This
might require a sort of haecceitism about spacetime points; at least it requires the existence
of apparently haecceitistic facts about points. It is natural, on the present approach, to
reject the possibility of such facts, since the symmetry of GR tells us that they do no work
in physical explanations. The principle of Leibniz equivalence thus extends straightforwardly
to GR.
What’s more, it permits the interpreter of GR to dodge an important problem the the-
ory raises for naive forms of substantivalism. This is the “hole argument” (see Earman and
Norton, 1987). If one does assume, contrary to the present approach, that there are distinct
physical possibilities related by diffeomorphisms, a strange sort of unobservable indetermin-
ism pops up in GR. This is because a diffeomorphism can sometimes leave a particular surface
of simultaneity (a state of the world “at a time”) unchanged while shuffling around what
happens at which point in the future of that surface. Since the shuffling changes nothing
invariant under GR’s symmetries, the indeterminism disappears on the present approach,
where only such invariants are physically real (Hoefer, 1996).
Besides being unobservable, the hole-argument indeterminism is spooky in that it offers
no probabilistic predictions about what will happen at which point. It simply entails that
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many diffeomorphism-related solutions (which the believer in Leibniz equivalence would
count as physically the same) are possible, without assigning likelihoods to any of them.
If this sort of chanceless, unobservable indeterminism strikes us (as I think it should) as a
theoretical problem for GR naively interpreted, the present approach to symmetries provides
a solution.
Some foundational confusion arises, however, in applying the present approach to narrow
down the fundamental physical quantities in GR. A natural requirement would seem to be
that the fundamental quantities remain constant along “gauge orbits,” curves in state space
that connect states related by diffeomorphisms. Quantities failing to meet this condition
would appear to be altered by symmetry transformations. But as Earman (2002) argues,
the list of quantities meeting this condition is very small, and includes no quantities that
take on different values at different times. Does this mean there is never temporal change in
any of GR’s fundamental quantities?
As Maudlin (2002) argues, this is an absurd result, since changing quantities like the
position of Mercury are the source of our evidence for GR in the first place. So Earman’s
argument must be an antinomy of sorts. Maudlin argues that this indicates a flaw in the
present approach to symmetries, but an alternative (although closely related) diagnosis by
Healey (2004) allows us to preserve the present approach while rejecting Earman’s conclusion.
As Healey points out, Earman’s assumptions about what counts as invariant under the
diffeomorphism symmetry of GR don’t hold up when the lesson of Leibniz equivalence is taken
into account. A paradigm example of an observable quantity in GR is the scalar curvature
of spacetime, R(x). This quantity changes along a gauge orbit because the mathematical
point x used to stand for a point p in physical spacetime can be altered by a diffeomorphism.
So while R’s value at p is left unchanged by the transformation, the formalism tells us
(misleadingly) that since R(x) is not unchanged, neither is the scalar curvature. This is the
misstep in Earman’s antinomy.
The present approach to symmetry has acquitted itself admirably in the philosophy of
space and time. It leads us to sensible and informative metaphysical conclusions while avoid-
ing the troubling implications of Earman’s antinomy and the hole argument’s indeterminism.
Moving on to other symmetries besides those of spacetime, we will find similar successes.
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4 Global internal symmetries and Humeanism
The symmetry transformations we just discussed act on a system by taking some spatiotem-
poral distribution of physical structures and rearranging it into a different distribution of
the same physical structures. There are also symmetries which involve only changes in the
values of the physical quantities. Since these transformations alter the value of the quantities
that constitute a physical structure, rather than changing anything spatially or temporally
external to it, we call them “internal symmetries.”
The most familiar example arises in introductory electrostatics. The electrostatic poten-
tial V (x) (measured in the unit of volts) is a quantity whose gradient at a point x determines
the electric field, and therefore the force, at x. Since adding a constant to V (x) (transforming
V (x)→ V (x)+c) does not change its gradient, such a transformation makes no difference to
the electrostatic force, and therefore no difference to the motion of charged particles. So any
such transformation leaves the dynamical law (Coulomb’s law) unchanged, and is therefore a
symmetry. We call it a “global” internal symmetry, since the transformation acts identically
on the value of V at every point (i.e., globally).
In another important example, the wavefunction ψ(x) which describes a system of par-
ticles in quantum mechanics is symmetric under a group of internal transformations called
phase transformations. ψ(x) is a complex-valued function on the 3N -dimensional space of
possible configurations forN particles. The likelihood of the particles’ locations falling within
a region R of this space on measurement is given by the integral of |ψ|2 over this region. The
square of a complex number is left unchanged if we multiply it by another complex number
of absolute value one. The complex numbers of absolute value one, each of form eiθ, θ ∈ R
form a group called U(1). Multiplying ψ(x) at every point by the same element of U(1) gives
a phase transformation, which leaves all probabilities (and relative phases) unchanged and
is therefore a symmetry of quantum mechanics.
Global internal symmetries of this sort present a challenge to a Humean combinatorial
metaphysics where the fundamental quantities are point-sized.5 This challenge arises in cases
where the symmetry transformations alter the numerical values of the fundamental point-
sized quantities – which should lead us to expect that the representation of these quantities
5According to such a view (e.g. David Lewis’s “Humean supervenience”), all features of worlds like the
one we live in supervene on the distribution of fundamental properties over points in spacetime.
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contains some surplus structure. In some cases (the quantum wavefunction is one such)
the surplus structure appears to include the representation of the quantities as localized at
points. After “modding out” the surplus, we are left with quantities less local or point-sized
than the ones we started with. Let’s look at the quantum example.
There are excellent reasons to be unsatisfied with a picture of quantum mechanics as
describing only probabilities for particles to show up somewhere when measured. What
counts as a measurement when all aspects of the world are presumably quantum? This is
the aptly-named measurement problem. One possible route to a solution is to suppose that
ψ(x) is a physical field on configuration space (see Albert, 1996).
This step in solving the measurement problem runs directly afoul of the present approach
to symmetries. The complex value of ψ(x) is altered by phase transformations, which are
symmetries of quantum theory. So therefore it cannot stand for a fundamental physical
quantity, but must instead represent surplus structure.
ψ(x) can’t be entirely surplus structure, since the values it takes at points fully deter-
mine a physical state and physical states must contain some qualitative information. So it
must be that the wavefunction consists partly of real physical information, and partly of
surplus structure. One way to get rid of the surplus is to suppose that |ψ(x)|2 is physi-
cally fundamental, and the breakdown of ψ into real and imaginary components is surplus.
Unfortunately, as Wallace (forthcoming, 52) points out, this leaves out information about
the relative phases of ψ’s components, which is of empirical import, since it determines the
degree of interference between these components.
Alternative candidates for fundamental quantities are given by other phase-invariant
quantities we can define in terms of ψ(x). One such is the density operator |ψ〉〈ψ|, an
operator on Hilbert space which contains all of the information about the state included in
the wavefunction. In a quantum theory defined on spacetime, like quantum field theory, one
can also construct a “local” density operator describing the state’s behavior in any region
of spacetime. Wallace and Timpson (forthcoming) have advanced an attractive view they
call “spacetime state realism,” according to which the density operators assigned to regions
stand for the fundamental quantities.
Due to the existence of entangled states, which exhibit instantaneous correlations between
distant parts of a physical system, the density operators which are fundamental in spacetime
state realism do not conform to Humean combinatorial metaphysics. The density operator
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of the region made up of regions A and B (their union) is not uniquely determined by the
operators assigned to A and B. In this way, a “spacetime state” universe is not built up of
localized parts that fully determine its large-scale features. Spacetime state realism, favored
by the present approach over the alternative wavefunction realist view, differs from that view
in part by denying what Lewis called Humean supervenience.
There may be alternative Humean ontologies for quantum theory which do respect phase
symmetry. For instance, Tumulka (2009) has proposed an ontology of instantaneous point-
sized “flashes” which are obviously invariant. But Tumulka’s ontology has so far been applied
to only a few toy quantum theories, whereas spacetime state realism applies to all of them
(since it uses only the pre-existing quantum formalism).
5 Gauge potentials and Aharonov-Bohm
When I transform the phase of a wavefunction ψ(x), I do so by multiplying it by the same
unit complex number at all points x. It is also possible for a similar theory to be symmetric
under internal transformations that differ from point to point (and even time to time).
This more complex type of symmetry is called a “local” internal symmetry, or local gauge
symmetry. Theories exhibiting it are called “gauge theories.”
Such theories make additional trouble for the Humean, if we hold to the present approach.
They also provide a case (like that of general relativity) in which the present approach dodges
serious problems of interpretation having to do with determinism. For in gauge theories,
ontologies which eschew the present approach to preserve a metaphysics of Humean point-
sized quantities face the problem of chanceless, unobservable indeterminism.
Although they may sound exotic, gauge theories are everywhere. The best-known exam-
ple is classical electrodynamics. In relativistic electrodynamics, the vector potential Ai(x)
is an often-used quantity. As a relativistic invariant, it is a four-dimensional vector; the
time component is the familiar electric potential V (x) (discussed above) while the space
components collectively form the magnetic potential. Since the value of V (x) is physically
unimportant, we would expect the same to be true of Ai(x)’s components, and indeed that
is correct. Physical predictions are fixed by the field tensor Fij(x) = ∂iAj(x)−∂jAi(x). This
quantity is left unchanged if we add the gradient of a scalar field to Ai(x), transforming
Ai(x) → Ai(x) + ∂iΛ(x). These are called (local) gauge transformations – local since they
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take on different values at different points x. Adding a gauge transformation to a vector
potential solution of Maxwell’s equations always gives us another solution.
Nothing prevents Λ(x) from taking on non-zero values in some parts of spacetime but
not others. In particular, in a given frame Λ(x) might be zero prior to t and non-zero after
t. This means that two solutions to Maxwell’s equations – two possibilities, according to
electrodynamics – can agree completely about the potential up until t while disagreeing
about its values thereafter. On any reasonable definition of determinism, this means that
Ai(x) does not evolve deterministically – its evolution is not even predicted probabilistically.
It is therefore a very poor choice of fundamental quantity for electromagnetism, which is
normally taken to be deterministic and whose observables evolve deterministically (except
in certain strange cases).
Cast in the extremely general “fiber bundle” formalism, this indeterminism is analogous
to the “hole problem” in general relativity we discussed earlier (see Healey, 2007). The
solution ought to be similar, i.e. a choice of potential should be similar to a choice of co-
ordinates, a conventional way of speaking about fundamental reality. One easy way to get
this result is just to stipulate that the field tensor Fij(x) is fundamental. (Since this quantity
isn’t changed by gauge transformations, we call it “gauge invariant.”) But such a posit is
undermined by a phenomenon called the Aharonov-Bohm effect.
In an Aharonov-Bohm experiment, a current is sent through a long (represented as infi-
nite) solenoid, or coiled electromagnet. The field Fij(x) remains zero outside the solenoid,
but the phase of complex waves passing by the solenoid is nonetheless altered. Since the
wavefunction ψ(x) of a quantum particle is a complex wave, and since its differences in phase
from other particles’ wavefunctions is observable, this leads to a measurable difference in the
behavior of quantum particles passing by solenoids despite the zero field in their vicinity.
If electromagnetic fields are the explanation for this behavior, they must act on quantum
particles at a distance – not a very elegant picture.
There are other gauge-invariant ontologies that can explain Aharonov-Bohm without ac-
tion at a distance, but as with spacetime state realism they are incompatible with a Humean
metaphysics. On one view, the fundamental quantities are so-called “holonomies,” which
are defined not at points but instead on closed loops in spacetime (Healey, 2007). Obviously
these are not local quantities in the sense preferred by Humean supervenience. On another
view, the fundamental quantities are gauge-invariant values of the so-called “connection,”
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which are (in Maudlin’s parlance) “hyper-local,” so that there is no determinate matter of
fact about whether distant spacetime points agree as to their value (Maudlin, 2007, 78-103).
Either way the present approach to symmetries, combined with the reasonable physicist’s
bias against discontinuous action at a distance, dictates a surprisingly revisionist ontology –
but one that preserves determinism against the specter of spooky unobservable indetermin-
ism.
6 Further questions
Considerations of space prevent me from posing, let alone addressing, all the interesting
problems in this area. To what extent do symmetries dictate the nature of forces? (Martin,
2002) How can they have empirical import? (Healey, 2009) Is the group a general enough
concept to represent all symmetries? (Guay and Hepburn, 2009) I leave the pursuit of these
problems to the interested reader.
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